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The Case for the Retroactive
Application of Crawford v. Washington
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Confrontation Clause, embedded in the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, guarantees all
criminal defendants the right to confront their accusers. 1
Described as the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth,” 2 the right of confrontation is considered
essential to a fair trial. 3 Indeed, it is one of the “fundamental

1

The full text of the Amendment reads,

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (emphasis added).
2
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (citing 5 Wigmore § 1367).
3
In Kirby v. United States, the Supreme Court referred to the Confrontation
Clause as “[o]ne of the fundamental guarantees of life and liberty,” and “a right long
deemed so essential for the due protection of life and liberty that it is guarded against
legislative and judicial action by provisions in the Constitution of the United States
and in the constitutions of most if not of all the States composing the Union.” 174 U.S.
47, 55-56 (1899).
Pointer v. Texas declared, “[t]he fact that this right appears in the Sixth
Amendment of our Bill of Rights reflects the belief of the Framers of those liberties and
safeguards that confrontation was a fundamental right essential to a fair trial in a
criminal prosecution.” The Court continued that, “the decisions of this Court and other
courts throughout the years have constantly emphasized the necessity for crossexamination as a protection for defendants in criminal cases.” 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965)
(footnote omitted).
Moreover, in 1807 Chief Justice Marshall wrote, “I know of no principal in
the preservation of which all are more concerned. I know none, by undermining which,
life, liberty and property, might be more endangered. It is therefore incumbent on
courts to be watchful of every inroad on a principal so truly important.” United States
v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 193 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694).
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guarantees of life and liberty,” 4 and “an essential and
fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this
country’s constitutional goal.” 5
In March of 2004, the Supreme Court decided Crawford
v. Washington, 6 redefining the landscape of Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence. 7 Crawford announced that no
testimonial statement may be admitted at trial against a
criminal defendant unless the defendant has the opportunity to
cross examine the declarant. 8 In short, Crawford significantly
reinterpreted the Confrontation Clause’s force and effect.
When the Supreme Court promulgates a rule, as in
Crawford, criminal defendants with pending litigation gain
access to the rule’s application on direct appeal. In order for a
criminal defendant who has exhausted all direct appellate
avenues, and whose conviction is final, to benefit from a recent
Court decision, however, he must attempt to do so on collateral
review. 9 If a rule is important enough, courts may apply it
4
Kirby, 174 U.S. at 55; accord Pointer, 380 U.S. at 410 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (referring to the right of cross-examination as “[o]ne of the fundamental
guarantees of life and liberty,” “one of the safeguards essential to a fair trial,” and, “as
indispensable an ingredient as the ‘right to be tried in a courtroom presided over by a
judge.’”) (citations omitted).
5
Pointer, 380 U.S. at 405 (emphasis added).
6
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
7
See, e.g., Neil P. Cohen & Donald F. Paine, Crawford v. Washington:
Confrontation Revolution, 40 TENN. B.J. 22, 22 (May 2004) (“On March 8, 2004, the
U.S. Supreme Court decided Michael Crawford’s appeal from a Washington State
conviction for assault and totally revised the modern approach to the Confrontation
Clause.”) (citation omitted); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington:
Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 511
(2005) (“In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court of the United States radically
changed [the] Confrontation Clause doctrine . . . .”); Rene L. Valladares, Crawford v.
Washington: The Confrontation Clause Gets Teeth, 12 NEV. LAW. 12, 12 (Sept. 2004)
(“The Court’s decision is anticipated to cause rapid and profound changes in how
hearsay statements are used against a defendant in a criminal trial. Appellate courts
have described Crawford as being a ‘bombshell,’ and a ‘paradigm shift in confrontation
clause analysis.’”); John F. Yetter, Wrestling with Crawford v. Washington and the New
Constitutional Law of Confrontation, 78 FLA. BAR J. 26, 26 (Oct. 2004) (“The Court
erased a body of precedent that was, if not completely favorable to the prosecution, well
understood and generally accommodating to the use of hearsay evidence without the
necessity of calling the declarant as a witness.”).
8
Prior to Crawford, the Supreme Court case that articulated the governing
Confrontation Clause doctrine was Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Under Roberts,
statements were routinely admitted at trial, without the defendant’s ability to crossexamine the declarant, if they were deemed reliable. Id. at 57. See Part II, infra, for a
discussion of Crawford and Roberts.
9
A defendant convicted in state court can seek collateral review using either
state or federal procedures. Usually, a state defendant will invoke state collateral
procedures before federal collateral procedures, though not required to do so. “After
state collateral procedures have been used unsuccessfully, the defendant may try
federal collateral remedies, especially federal habeas corpus.” NEIL P. COHEN &
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retroactively on collateral review, thus broadening the rule to
reach even those defendants with final convictions. 10
Therefore, if Crawford is deemed retroactive, a defendant with
a final conviction may seek collateral review alleging Crawford
violations, even if Crawford was decided after the conviction
became final.
The Supreme Court generally disfavors retroactivity,
and accordingly, has fashioned a standard difficult to satisfy. 11
In fact, under the Supreme Court’s current standard no “new”
rule has been applied retroactivity. 12 Crawford, however, is a
rule of paramount importance. The Constitution guarantees
the right of confrontation, yet, prior to Crawford the law ran
afoul of that Constitutional mandate. Crawford corrected a
serious flaw in the Court’s Confronation Clause jurisprudence,
and its rule is so crucial to the legitimacy of criminal
proceedings that it must be applied retroactively.
Part II of this Note discusses the significance of
Crawford’s holding by recapitulating the weaknesses of the
pre-Crawford test and describing the improvements made by
Crawford. Part III summarizes the high bar set by the
Supreme Court’s current retroactivity doctrine, specifically
Teague v. Lane 13 and its progeny. More specifically, Part III
elaborates on the contours of the second exception to Teague’s
DONALD J. HALL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE POST-INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS CASES AND
MATERIALS 805 (2d ed. 2000).
The federal habeas statute provides that a federal court “shall entertain an
application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody . . . on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(a) (1982); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 1312 (4th ed. 2004) (“[T]hrough the federal writ of habeas corpus, a state
defendant may challenge his state conviction on federal constitutional grounds in the
federal courts.”).
A defendant convicted in federal court can file a Motion to Vacate Sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to challenge the constitutionality of his conviction. “A §
2255 Motion involves virtually the same issues and procedures as federal habeas
corpus.” COHEN & HALL, supra note 9, at 848.
10
See LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 1359-61.
11
See, e.g., id. at 1359 (“[T]he second Teague exception is quite restrictive.”);
Cohen & Hall, supra note 9, at 843 (“Recent Supreme Court decisions have greatly
reduced the chances that a habeas corpus petitioner will be able to get relief based on a
recent decision or a novel theory.”).
12
“Beginning with the rule at issue in Teague, the Court has measured at
least eleven new rules, or proposed new rules, of criminal procedure against the
criteria for the second exception and, in every case, has refused to apply the rule
retroactively.” United States v. Mandanici, 205 F.3d 519, 529 (2d Cir. 2000). The
Second Circuit proceeded to list a number of cases illustrating this pattern. Id. See
also Part III.A, infra, to learn what constitutes a “new” rule.
13
489 U.S. 288 (1989) (establishing the current standard for “new” rule
retroactivity). For a further discussion of the Teague standard, see infra Part III.
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general bar to retroactivity. Part IV argues that the Crawford
rule fits within the narrowly construed second Teague
exception. It does so by drawing from the Court’s language in
Crawford, discussing pre-Teague precedent, distinguishing the
previous rules that the Supreme Court has declined to make
retroactive, and analogizing the Crawford rule to a rule that
achieved retroactivity under Teague in lower state and federal
courts.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

Crawford’s Facts and Procedural History

On August 5, 1999, Michael Crawford and his wife
Sylvia visited a friend, Rubin Richard Kenneth Lee. 14 During
the visit Michael Crawford stabbed Lee because Crawford
thought Lee sexually assaulted Sylvia. 15 After the police
apprehended Michael Crawford, he and Sylvia each gave
recorded statements to the police in which they recounted the
events that precipitated the stabbing. 16 Their statements
differed in one very significant way; Michael said that Lee
reached for a weapon of his own before Michael stabbed him,
intimating that Michael acted in self-defense, while Sylvia said
she never saw Lee with a weapon, intimating that Michael was
the lone aggressor. 17 Michael Crawford was then prosecuted
for assault and attempted murder. 18
At trial, Michael Crawford claimed self-defense. 19 Sylvia
Crawford did not testify because Michael Crawford invoked
Washington’s marital privilege, which allowed him to prevent
his wife from testifying against him. 20 The prosecution did,
however, introduce her tape-recorded statement incriminating
Michael, despite the fact that she was not available to be cross-

14

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004).
Id.
16
Id. at 38-40.
17
Id. at 38-39 (“Sylvia generally corroborated petitioner’s story about the
events leading up to the fight, but her account of the fight itself was arguably
different – particularly with respect to whether Lee had drawn a weapon before
petitioner assaulted him . . . .”) Michael Crawford said, “I think that he pulled
somethin’ out and I grabbed for it and that’s how I got cut,” while Sylvia, when asked if
she saw anything in Lee’s hands, said “um um (no).” Id. at 39-40.
18
Id. at 40.
19
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 (2004).
20
Id.
15
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examined. 21 Her statement that Lee did not have a weapon
was fatal to Michael Crawford’s self-defense claim, 22 and he
was convicted of assault. 23
Crawford then challenged his conviction on the grounds
that the admission of Sylvia’s statement violated his Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation. 24 The Washington Supreme
Court, applying the then-controlling United States Supreme
Court precedent, Ohio v. Roberts, 25 upheld Crawford’s
conviction, concluding that Sylvia’s statement “bore guarantees
of trustworthiness.” 26 Crawford then appealed his conviction to
the United States Supreme Court. 27
B.

Hearsay

Statements, like Sylvia’s, made out-of-court and offered
as evidence to prove that which they assert are hearsay. 28 The
Federal Rules of Evidence 29 generally bar hearsay because
hearsay is thought to be unreliable. Underlying the hearsay
rule is the idea that if the declarant—the one who made the
statement—is not in court there is no way to judge the veracity
of the statement; hence, the statement is presumptively
unreliable. 30 The Federal Rules of Evidence do, however,
21

Id.
In fact, in closing argument the prosecutor referred to Sylvia’s statement
as “‘damning evidence’ that ‘completely refute[d] [Crawford’s] claim of self-defense.’”
Id. at 40-41.
23
Id. at 41.
24
Id. at 40-41.
25
Crawford,
541
U.S.
at
41
(“The
Washington
Supreme
Court . . . conclud[ed] that, although Sylvia’s statement did not fall under a firmly
rooted hearsay exception, it bore guarantees of trustworthiness . . . .”). The test from
Roberts allowed for the admission of ex-parte testimony if it bore “adequate ‘indicia of
reliability.’” Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). To satisfy that test, evidence had
to either fall within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bear “particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.” Id.
26
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41.
27
Id.
28
FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted.”) (adopting the common law definition of hearsay). Michael
Crawford was convicted in state court, and hence, the applicable rules of evidence were
those of the State of Washington. This Note refers to the Federal Rules to exemplify
the law of evidence, and not to imply that they were used at Michael Crawford’s trial.
29
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 802 (“Hearsay is not admissible except as provided
by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority or by Act of Congress.”).
30
“[T]he chief goal of the hearsay rule is to enhance the fact-finding process
by excluding certain declarations whenever the declarants cannot be subjected to cross22
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provide for exceptions. In other words, there are situations in
which statements, though hearsay, may be admitted
nonetheless. 31 These exceptions generally proceed on the
notion that some statements, though made out-of-court, are
still reliable enough to be valuable as evidence. For example,
Rule 804(b)(3) provides that hearsay statements made against
the declarant’s interest are admissible. 32 The Rules of Evidence
consider statements against interest more reliable than other
hearsay because the Rules assume that declarants do not make
untruthful statements that are self-incriminating.
Sylvia Crawford’s statement was clearly hearsay. It
was made out-of-court, and it was offered by the prosecution to
prove what it asserted—that Lee did not have a weapon. The
court, however, admitted her statement against her husband
under Washington’s version of the “statement against interest”
exception because, as the argument went, Sylvia implicated
herself as an accomplice in the assault, and therefore, she
would not have made the statement had it not been true. 33
Accordingly, the court admitted her statement at trial, even
though Michael Crawford was unable to cross-examine her. 34
C.

The Confrontation Clause

The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides
criminal defendants with an extra layer of protection against
hearsay statements. By guaranteeing the defendant the right
to be confronted with the witnesses against him, the
Confrontation Clause aims to insure that certain statements,
notwithstanding the rules of hearsay, be excluded unless the
declarant is cross-examined. Thus, even if a statement fits
examination. The rule achieves this goal by permitting the opposing party to object to
the use of out-of-court statements that are offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. Since the use of hearsay can deprive the opponent of an opportunity to
challenge the credibility of the hearsay declarant, the rule proceeds on the assumption
that cross-examination is vital to assuring the reliability of evidence.” Miguel A.
Mendez, Crawford v. Washington: A Critique, 57 STAN. L. REV. 569, 574 (2004).
31
FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (listing statements not included in the definition of
hearsay, and thus, not barred by Rule 802), 803 (listing hearsay exceptions that apply
even if the declarant is available), 804 (listing hearsay exceptions that apply only if the
declarant is unavailable), 807 (providing for the residual exception).
32
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
33
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 (“Noting that Sylvia had admitted she led
petitioner to Lee’s apartment and thus had facilitated the assault, the State invoked
the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest.”) (citing WASH. R. EVID.
804(b)(3) (2003)).
34
Id. at 40-41.
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within a hearsay exception it will be inadmissible if it runs
afoul of the Confrontation Clause. 35
Therefore, insofar as hearsay declarants constitute
“witnesses against” a criminal defendant for the purposes of
the Confrontation Clause, the Constitution bars admission of
the statements. 36 Not all hearsay admitted against a criminal
defendant implicates the Confrontation Clause, however, and
prior to Crawford the Supreme Court struggled to define
exactly what kind of hearsay would trigger the right of
confrontation. 37
The Supreme Court first attempted to formulate a
workable Confrontation Clause doctrine in Ohio v. Roberts. 38
Roberts articulated a two-part test for the admission of hearsay
against the accused, informed by the Court’s pragmatic
balancing of society’s interests in law enforcement and finality
against an individual’s constitutional right to confrontation. 39
Hearsay was admissible under Roberts if, first, the declarant
was unavailable, and second, the hearsay statement bore
“indicia of reliability.” 40 If the statement qualified under a
“firmly rooted hearsay exception” it was presumptively
reliable. 41 Otherwise, a statement could still be admissible if it
bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” 42 In other
words, under Roberts, if the declarant was unavailable, and the
35
See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE STATUTORY AND
CASE SUPPLEMENT 394 (2004-05) (“[T]he Constitution is a higher law than the Federal
Rules of Evidence, but not necessarily a stricter law. Evidence permitted by the rules
of evidence but forbidden by the Confrontation Clause must stay out. Evidence
permitted by the Confrontation Clause but excluded by the rules of evidence also must
stay out.”).
36
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
37
See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 35, at 393-94.
38
448 U.S. 56 (1980). Prior to Roberts, “the Court issued a number of ad hoc
judgments to resolve particular controversies, but made little attempt to systematize
the Confrontation Clause’s impact on the admission of hearsay.” FISHER, supra note
34, at 394.
39
In Roberts, the Court recognized that:

[C]ompeting interests, if “closely examined” may warrant dispensing with
confrontation at trial. ‘[G]eneral rules of law of this kind, however beneficent
in their operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to
considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.’ Significantly,
every jurisdiction has a strong interest in effective law enforcement, and in
the development and precise formulation of the rules of evidence applicable
in criminal proceedings.
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64 (citations omitted).
40
Id. at 66.
41
Id.
42
Id.
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statement was deemed reliable, the hearsay was admissible
notwithstanding the absence of confrontation. 43 Accordingly,
the Washington Supreme Court rejected Michael Crawford’s
Confrontation Clause challenge because the court concluded
that, under Roberts, Sylvia’s statement bore “guarantees of
trustworthiness.” 44
D.

Crawford’s Holding

On March 8, 2004, however, a unanimous Supreme
Court reversed Crawford’s conviction on the grounds that the
use of Sylvia Crawford’s statement violated Michael Crawford’s
Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers. 45 Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion, joined by six justices, 46 overruled
Roberts, 47 and formulated a new standard to govern the
admissibility of hearsay statements against a criminal
defendant.
Under Crawford, the reliability of the statement is
irrelevant; the nature of the statement is all that matters. 48
Justice Scalia looked at the text of the Amendment, and
determined that the Confrontation Clause concerns only
statements made by declarants who bear witness against the
accused. Thus, not all hearsay implicates the Constitution,
only hearsay statements that are testimonial in nature do. 49
Furthermore, Justice Scalia noted that the Confrontation

43

Id.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 41 (2004).
45
Id.
46
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined
Scalia’s majority opinion. Id. at 37. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor
concurred in the reversal, but argued that the result did not require overruling Roberts.
Id. at 69.
47
Some lower courts have continued to apply Roberts to non-testimonial
statements. See, e.g., Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 83-84 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that
unless statements are testimonial “Crawford is inapplicable and Roberts continues to
apply”); State v. Rivera, 844 A.2d 191, 200-01 (Conn. 2004) (“nontestimonial hearsay
statements may still be admitted as evidence against an accused in a criminal trial if it
satisfies both prongs of the Roberts test, irrespective of whether the defendant had a
prior opportunity to cross examine the declarant.”). The general consensus, however, is
that Roberts no longer has any precedential value. See FISHER, supra note 35, at 431.
48
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (“Admitting statements deemed reliable by a
judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation.”).
49
Id. at 51 (“[N]ot all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment’s core
concerns. . . . It applies to ‘witnesses’ against the accused—in other words, those who
‘bear testimony.’”) (citing 1 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1828)).
44
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Clause does not guarantee reliable evidence; it guarantees a
process by which the reliability of evidence is to be judged. 50
Accordingly, the Crawford Court criticized the Roberts
test for being both too broad and too narrow. Too broad,
argued the Court, because it subjected non-testimonial
statements to Constitutional scrutiny, and too narrow because
it routinely admitted testimonial statements upon a mere
Roberts’s
showing of reliability, absent confrontation. 51
“malleable standard,” according to the Court, “often fail[ed] to
protect against paradigmatic confrontation violations.” 52
Crawford concluded, therefore, that “[w]here testimonial
statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability
sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the
Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.” 53
Although Justice Scalia and the Crawford Court opted
not to define testimonial, 54 clearly, according to the Court,
Sylvia Crawford’s statement constituted testimony, and
therefore, was barred by the Confrontation Clause. 55 By telling
the police that Lee did not have a weapon, and hence did not
50
Id. at 61 (“The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about the
desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be little dissent), but
about how reliability can best be determined.”).
51
Id. at 60 (“First, [the Roberts test] is too broad: It applies the same mode of
analysis whether or not the hearsay consists of ex parte testimony. This often results
in close constitutional scrutiny in cases that are far removed from the core concerns of
the Clause. At the same time, however, the test is too narrow: It admits statements
that do consist of ex parte testimony upon a mere finding of reliability.”).
52
Id.
53
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69 (2004) (emphasis added).
54
Id. at 68 (“We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive
definition of ‘testimonial.’”). The Court did, however, offer the following three possible
standards, but opts not to chose among them:

1) “‘[E]x parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is,
material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the
defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that
declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially’”;
2) “‘[E]xtrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions’”;
and
3) “‘[S]tatements that were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available
for use at a later trial.”
Id. at 51-52 (citations omitted).
55
Id. at 68 (“Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to
police interrogations. These are the modern practices with closest kinship to the abuses
at which the Confrontation Clause was directed.”).
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pose a threat to Michael Crawford, Sylvia Crawford bore
witness, or testified, against her husband. Because Sylvia
Crawford did not appear at trial, Michael Crawford could not
cross-examine her regarding her testimony. Thus, admitting
Sylvia’s statement as incriminating evidence against Michael
Crawford constituted a paradigmatic Confrontation Clause
violation.
In summary, with Crawford, “the U.S. Supreme Court
radically transformed its doctrine governing the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.” 56
One commentator described the case as “a very positive
development, restoring to its central position one of the basic
protections of the common law system of criminal justice.” 57
Crawford, however, left many questions unanswered. 58
One such question is whether or not Crawford’s radical
transformation 59 of Confrontation Clause interpretation should
be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. 60 In other
words, will a defendant with a final conviction based on
hearsay evidence admissible under Roberts yet inadmissible
under Crawford be able to attack his conviction on collateral
review alleging a Crawford violation? Although the Supreme
Court has made retroactivity difficult to achieve, 61 certainly a
rule that drastically reinterprets 62 a Constitutional guarantee
as important 63 as the Confrontation Clause should suffice.
III.

THE TEAGUE FRAMEWORK FOR RETROACTIVITY ANALYSIS

To resolve the question of retroactivity, one must
analyze Crawford’s rule under the framework provided by
Teague v. Lane. 64 Decided in 1989, Teague articulated the
56
Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision Restores
Confrontation Clause Protection, 19 CRIM. JUST. 5 (Summer 2004).
57
Id.
58
Id.; see Mosteller, supra note 7, at 623 (“Crawford leaves many important
issues undecided regarding the scope of its application.”).
59
Mosteller, supra note 7, at 511.
60
Richard Alan Ginkowski, Introduction to Friedman, supra note 56, at 5
(“Also unclear is whether the holding may be applied retroactively.”).
61
See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
62
See supra note 7.
63
See supra notes 2-5.
64
489 U.S. 288 (1989). The Teague standard only governs if direct appeal
has been completed. New rules apply retroactively to all criminal cases still pending
on direct appeal. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004); Griffith v. Kentucky,
479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987).
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current governing standard by which retroactivity is to be
determined. 65
A.

“New” or “Old”?

The threshold question under Teague is whether the
rule at issue is “new” or “old.” 66 Essentially, “a case announces
a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new
obligation on the States or the Federal Government,” 67 or “if the
result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the
defendant’s conviction became final.” 68 In contrast, a rule is
“old” for retroactivity purposes if it is a mere application of
In Butler v. McKellar the Court
existing precedent. 69
expounded further on the Teague definition of a “new rule,”
concluding that a rule is “new” if reasonable minds could have
differed about the result of the decision before it was
rendered. 70 The great weight of the authority suggests that
Crawford announced a “new” rule. 71 Accordingly, this Note
treats Crawford’s rule as “new” for the purposes of its
analysis. 72 “New” rules trigger Teague scrutiny.
65

LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 1355-61.
Teague, 489 U.S. at 301; see also People v. Eastman, 648 N.E.2d 459, 464
(N.Y. 1995) (“The threshold issue in determining whether to apply a constitutional rule
retroactively is characterization of the rule as “new” or “old.”).
67
Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 62 (1987)).
68
Id. (citing Truesdale v. Aiken, 480 U.S. 527, 528-29 (1987) (Powell, J.,
dissenting)).
69
Id.
70
494 U.S. 407, 417 (1990).
71
Dorchy v. Jones, 398 F.3d 783, 788 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Teague thus prohibits
Dorchy from availing himself of the new rule articulated in Crawford.”); Bintz v.
Bertrand, 403 F.3d 859, 866-67 (7th Cir. 2005) (“It seems clear that Crawford was a
clean break from the line of precedent established by Roberts. Crawford considered and
rejected the continuing application of Roberts. . . . Crawford was thus a new rule for
purposes of Teague.”); Murillo v. Frank, 402 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2005) (“It is obvious
to us . . . that Crawford establishes a new rule.”); Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010,
1015-16 (9th Cir. 2005) (“On balance, an analysis of the historical application of the
Confrontation Clause cases leads to the conclusion that Crawford announces a new
rule . . . .”); Brown v. Uphoff, 381 F.3d 1219, 1226 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Thus, Roberts and
its progeny did not dictate the result in Crawford and we conclude that it announces a
new rule of constitutional law.”); Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 335 (2d Cir. 2004)
(assuming for the purposes of Teague analysis that Crawford announced a new rule);
see also Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438, 444-45 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying, in dictum,
Teague’s “new rule” framework to the Crawford rule).
72
Some have argued that Crawford announced an “old” rule. For interesting
arguments, see Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1023 (9th Cir. 2005) (Noonan, J.,
concurring) (“Crawford, therefore, does not announce a new rule. Retroactivity is not
an issue.”); Murillo v. Frank, 316 F. Supp. 2d 744, 749-50 n.4 (E.D. Wisc. 2004) (“The
question is close because although Crawford rejected the application of Roberts to
66
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Teague’s “New” Rule Framework

Essentially, Teague established a presumptive bar to
the retroactive application of “new” rules on collateral review,
subject to two exceptions. The first exception allows for
retroactivity if the conduct for which the defendant was
convicted has become constitutionally protected, and the
second, if the “new” rule is a watershed rule of criminal
procedure, implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 73 The first
exception certainly does not apply to Crawford since
Crawford’s rule does not concern conduct. Therefore, if deemed
a “new” rule, Crawford’s retroactivity hinges on whether it fits
within the contours of the second exception. In other words, to
warrant retroactivity Crawford’s rule must be deemed a
watershed rule of criminal procedure implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.
C.

Teague’s Second Exception as Interpreted by Subsequent
Cases

Teague’s second exception is decidedly difficult to
satisfy.
In fact, the exception has grown “exceedingly
narrow,” 74 including only a “small core of rules requiring
observance of those procedures that . . . are implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.” 75 Indeed, “it is not enough that a
new rule is aimed at improving the accuracy of trial, or even
testimonial statements, the Court had never explicitly applied Roberts to such
statements.’ Thus, it can be argued that Crawford did not announce a new rule at
all.”) (citation omitted); Richardson v. Newland, 342 F. Supp. 2d 900, 924 (E.D. Cal.
2004) (“Crawford did not announce a new rule at all but rather is entirely faithful to
the Supreme Court’s prior decisions in this area”).
If a rule is deemed “old” it is applied retroactively to all cases on collateral
review. See Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 216 n.3 (1988) (“[W]hen a decision of this
Court merely has applied settled precedents to new and different factual situations, no
real question has arisen as to whether the later decision should apply
retrospectively.”). Accordingly, only “new” rules are subject to analysis under the
Teague exceptions.
73
The standard adopted by Teague originated with Justice Harlan. Justice
Harlan, however, advocated a more lenient second exception. Under Justice Harlan’s
standard a new rule would be retroactive if the previous rule created “an impermissibly
large risk that the innocent will be convicted.” Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244,
262 (1969). Thus, according to Justice Harlan “all ‘new’ constitutional rules which
significantly improve the pre-existing fact-finding procedures are to be retroactively
applied on habeas.” Id. Teague, however, narrowed the second exception, requiring a
rule to be a watershed rule of criminal procedure.
74
United States v. Mandanici, 205 F.3d 519, 528 (2d Cir. 2000).
75
Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417 (2004) (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506
U.S. 461, 478 (1993)).
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that it promotes the objectives of fairness and accuracy.” 76 But
the adoption of a “new” rule must be a “ground breaking
occurrence,” 77 and one that “alter[s] our understanding of the
bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a
proceeding.” 78 Moreover, the rule must signal “a sweeping
change that applies to a large swathe of cases rather than a
narrow right that applies only to a limited class of cases.” 79
Notwithstanding the narrowness of Teague’s second exception,
however, it must exist for a reason. Therefore, certain rules,
like Crawford, must be capable of fitting within its narrow
contours. 80
Since Teague was decided in 1989 the Supreme Court
has considered twelve “new” rules for retroactive application
and has found them all insufficient. 81 The Court recently noted
that “it should come as no surprise that [it] ha[s] yet to find a
new rule that falls under the second Teague exception.” 82
Additionally, the Supreme Court has declared several
times that to achieve “watershed” status a new rule must
compare, in terms of significance, with the rule espoused in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 83 which confered the right of counsel on
indigent defendants. 84 Thus, when the Court considers a “new”
rule as a candidate for retroactivity, the Court compares the
importance of the new rule to that of Gideon’s rule. 85 No “new”
rule has yet prevailed under this analysis. 86 None considered,

76

Mandanici, 205 F.3d at 528 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 396 (1994).
78
Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 241-42 (1990) (quoting Mackey v. United
States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971)).
79
Mandanici, 205 F.3d at 528 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
80
Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he bar is not
absolute and the Crawford rule meets the Court’s criteria.”).
81
See Mandanici, 205 F.3d at 529 (“[Since 1989, b]eginning with the rule at
issue in Teague, the Court has measured at least eleven new rules, or proposed new
rules, of criminal procedure against the criteria for the second Teague exception and, in
every case, has refused to apply the rule at issue retroactively on habeas review.”).
Moreover, since Mandanici the Supreme Court has extended that streak by two, failing
to apply the second Teague exception in two more cases. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542
U.S. 348, 355-58; Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 419-20 (2004).
82
Beard, 542 U.S. at 417.
83
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
84
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990); see Beard, 542 U.S. at 417.
85
See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 170 (1996); Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495
(stating that a rule must be of the “primacy and centrality of the rule adopted in
Gideon or other rules which may be thought to be within the exception”); Mandanici,
205 F.3d at 528-29 (citing O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 167 (1997)).
86
See supra note 12.
77
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significance

of

CRAWFORD IS A WATERSHED RULE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE ESSENTIAL TO FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS,
AND THUS, SHOULD BE MADE RETROACTIVE PURSUANT
TO TEAGUE’S SECOND EXCEPTION

Since the Supreme Court decided Teague it has not
addressed the retroactivity of a “new” rule concerning the
Confrontation Clause. Authority suggests, however, that
Crawford satisfies Teague’s strictures. Although the Supreme
Court, under the Teague standard, has not made a “new” rule
retroactive, every rule considered lacked the significance of
Crawford’s rule. 88 Indeed, Crawford is more akin to the Gideon
rule 89 than any rule that has sought retroactivity before the
Court.
Moreover, in both Roberts v. Russell 90 and Barber v.
Page 91 the Supreme Court gave retroactive effect to a rule
implicating the Confrontation Clause.
Although these
decisions predate Teague, they demonstrate that the public
interests that weigh against retroactivity must yield when they
conflict with the right of confrontation. 92
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s holding in Cruz v.
New York 93 also implicated the Confrontation Clause, 94 and was
made retroactive by both the New York Court of Appeals 95 and
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 96 Both courts
conducted retroactivity analysis under the Teague framework. 97

87
See infra Part IV.A (arguing that Crawford is more significant that the
other rules considered for retroactivity under Teague); see also supra note 12.
88
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
89
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (conferring the right of
counsel on indigent defendants).
90
392 U.S. 293, 294 (1968) (giving retroactive effect to Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), which prohibited the admission, at a joint trial, of a
codefendant’s inculpatory extrajudicial confession).
91
390 U.S. 719 (1968).
92
Id. at 294-95.
93
481 U.S. 186, 193 (1987) (barring admission of an interlocking confession of
a non-testifying defendant).
94
Id.
95
People v. Eastman, 648 N.E.2d 459, 460 (N.Y. 1995).
96
Graham v. Hoke, 946 F.2d 982, 993 (2d Cir. 1991).
97
See id.; Eastman, 648 N.E.2d at 464-65.
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Accordingly, if ever there could be a rule capable of
satisfying Teague’s second exception, surely Crawford, giving
new life to an essential and fundamental constitutional
guarantee, 98 should be it.
A.

Crawford is More Significant Than All the Previous
“New” Rules That the Supreme Court has Declined to
Apply Retroactively

The Supreme Court has contemplated the retroactive
application of a “new” rule twelve 99 times, and each time
determined that the rule at issue failed to satisfy the
requirements of Teague’s second exception. 100 None of those
rules, however, implicated the Confrontation Clause. The
Crawford rule, according to the Supreme Court, corrects an
“unpardonable [constitutional] vice.” 101 Crawford is exactly the
kind of rule contemplated by the second Teague exception.
Indeed, Crawford has “the primacy and centrality of the rule
adopted in Gideon,” 102 and must succeed where the others have
failed.
Of the twelve “new” rules that have failed under
Teague, nine concern sentencing, and hence, bear only

98

See discussion supra Parts I, II.
Teague itself, while formulating the retroactivity standard, considered the
retroactivity of the rule announced in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In
Batson the Court held that if a defendant can establish a prima facie case that the
prosecutor used peremptory challenges to eliminate members of the jury venire that
were of the defendant’s race, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to rebut the inference
of discrimination. The prosecutor may rebut the inference of discrimination by
showing a neutral reason for challenging the jurors, but if he cannot, the peremptory
challenges constitute an Equal Protection violation. Id. at 96-97.
The petitioner in Teague sought the benefit of Batson “even though his
conviction became final before Batson was decided.” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 294
(1989). Before Teague, however, the Supreme Court in Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255
(1986), applying the pre-Teague retroactivity standard of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618, 636 (1965), found that Batson was not retroactive. Teague found Allen v. Hardy
“dispositive,” and hence, denied the petitioner the benefit of Batson. Teague, 489 U.S.
at 296.
Accordingly, Teague did not apply the standard it enunciated to the Batson
rule, it deferred to Allen v. Hardy’s evaluation of Batson under the then-governing
Linkletter standard. Therefore, this Note does not address Teague’s holding with
respect to the retroactivity of Batson.
100
See supra note 12; see also Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 355-58
(2004) (declining to make a new rule retroactive); Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 419-20
(2004) (same).
101
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004).
102
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990).
99
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tangentially on the accuracy of the trial. 103 These sentencing
rules are fundamentally different from, and less important to
the truth-finding function than the Crawford rule. Most
significantly, sentencing rules affect only the portion of the
trial subsequent to the verdict. While the severity of a criminal
defendant’s sentence is substantially important to the criminal
justice system, Teague requires “new” rules to impact guilt or

103
First, in Schriro, the Supreme Court declined to give retroactive effect to
the rule announce in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Schriro, 542 U.S. at 355-58.
Ring declared that the existence of an aggravating factor which could make a
defendant eligible for the death sentence must be proved to a jury rather than a trial
judge. 536 U.S. at 609. The defendant in Schriro was sentenced to death under the
previous rule, which allowed the trial judge, rather than the jury, to determine the
presence of the aggravating factor. 542 U.S. at 350. The defendant, Summerlin, sought
the benefit of the Ring rule on habeas review, and his request was denied by a five to
four decision of the Supreme Court. Id. at 350, 358.
The next two cases, Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (2004), and Graham v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 461 (1993), the Supreme Court contemplated the retroactivity of
“new” rules concerning the ability of the jury to consider mitigating factors in capital
sentencing proceedings. In Beard the Supreme Court examined the “new” rule of Mills
v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) which declared invalid capital sentencing schemes
requiring juries to disregard mitigating factors not found unanimously. Id. at 375.
Graham dealt with a proposed rule declaring as unconstitutional jury instructions
which disallowed sentencing juries to consider mitigating evidence. 506 U.S. at 464.
Both rules fell short of the Teague standard. Beard, 542 U.S. at 419-20; Graham, 506
U.S. at 463.
Fourth, in O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151 (1997), the Court held that
the rule of Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), which entitles a capital
defendant to inform his sentencing jury that he is parole-ineligible if the prosecution
claims that he is a future danger, id. at 161-62, failed under Teague analysis. O’Dell,
521 U.S. at 167.
Fifth, the rule announced in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992) (per
curiam), also failed under Teague to achieve retroactive application as a “new” rule.
Mandanici, 205 F.3d at 529. Espinosa declared “that in certain states where a
sentencing judge is required to give deference to a jury’s advisory sentencing
recommendation with respect to the death penalty, neither the jury nor the judge is
permitted to consider invalid aggravating circumstances.” Id.
Sixth, Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152 (1996), declined to make
retroactive a rule that the state’s failure to give adequate notice of some of the evidence
it intended to use in the petitioners’ capital sentence proceeding violated due process.
Id. at 170.
Seventh, Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 386, 396 (1994), declined to
make retroactive a rule declaring that “twice subject[ing] a criminal defendant to a
noncapital sentence enhancement proceeding” violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Eighth, Saffle, declined to apply retroactively a rule that the trial court’s
instruction in the petitioner’s capital sentencing proceeding, “telling the jury to avoid
any influence of sympathy, violates the Eighth Amendment.” 494 U.S. at 486.
Ninth, Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990), subjected the rule of Caldwell
v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) to Teague analysis, and like the others, the rule
failed to satisfy Teague’s strict requirements. Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 241-45. Caldwell’s
rule “prohibits the imposition of a death sentence by a sentencer that has been led to
the false belief that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the
defendant’s capital sentence lies elsewhere.” Id. at 233 (citing Caldwell, 472 U.S. at
328-29).
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innocence to warrant retroactivity. 104 Therefore, even a “new”
rule of sentencing impacting the imposition of the death
penalty—the harshest sentence available—will likely fail
under Teague, because sentencing rules simply do not concern
the determination of guilt or innocence. 105
In contrast, the Crawford rule interprets the right of
confrontation, which is necessary to ferret out truth from an
accuser’s testimony. Crawford bears directly on the kind of
information that reaches the jury, and it goes to the very heart
of the truth-finding process. A rule that implicates the
accuracy of the truth-finding process certainly has the likely
potential to impact guilt or innocence, as required by Teague.
Accordingly, Crawford comports with Teague’s vision of a
retroactive rule, while rules concerning sentencing do not.
Of the “new” rule retroactivity candidates that did not
concern sentencing, none were as important as Crawford.
First, in Goeke v. Branch the Supreme Court refused to apply
retroactively a rule that prohibited state appellate courts from
dismissing the appeal of a recaptured fugitive. 106 The Court
aptly observed that since “due process does not require a State
to provide appellate process at all, a former fugitive’s right to
appeal cannot be said to be so central to an accurate
determination of innocence or guilt as to fall within [the
second] exception to the Teague bar.” 107 On the contrary, the
Constitution guarantees the right of confrontation, and the
Supreme Court has incorporated it through the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states. 108
Therefore, since Crawford implicates a fundamental
constitutional guarantee, it deserves retroactivity more than a
rule concerning a non-constitutional right to appeal.

104
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313 (1989) (“Because we operate from the
premise that such procedures would be so central to an accurate determination of
innocence or guilt, we believe it unlikely that many such components of basic due
process have yet to emerge.”).
105
Id. Since the petitioner in Teague was not under a sentence of death the
plurality limited its holding to the non-capital context. The plurality, however,
explicitly confirmed that the finality concerns that drove its analysis applied also in the
capital context. Id. at 314 n.2.
106
Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 120-21 (1995) (per curiam).
107
Id. at 120 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
108
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (“We hold today that the Sixth
Amendment’s right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is likewise a
fundamental right and is made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
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Gilmore v. Taylor 109 considered the retroactive
application of the rule announced in Falconer v. Lane, 110 and
the Court again decided that the “new” rule failed to satisfy
Teague’s strictures. 111 Falconer declared that “the failure to
instruct a jury that it could not return a murder conviction if it
found that the defendant possessed a mitigating mental state
violates due process.” 112 A jury considers a mitigating mental
state, however, only after it finds the facts constituting the
underlying offense.
Thus, the Falconer rule bears on
culpability, not the accuracy of the facts. The Crawford rule,
on the other hand, concerns the accuracy of the underlying
facts.
Crawford provides the jury greater access to
information, which significantly increases the likelihood that
the jury will arrive at an accurate decision.
Butler v. McKellar 113 declined to make retroactive the
rule announced in Arizona v. Roberson, 114 which had declared
that “the Fifth Amendment bars police-initiated interrogation
following a suspect’s request for counsel in the context of a
separate investigation.” 115 Butler concluded that “[b]ecause a
violation of Roberson’s added restrictions on police
investigatory procedures would not seriously diminish the
likelihood of obtaining an accurate determination – indeed, it
may increase that likelihood – . . . Roberson did not establish
any principle that would come within the second exception.” 116
Apparently, the Butler majority operated from the premise that
a confession obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment may
be truthful nonetheless, and hence, its admission at trial may
in fact conduce to a more accurate fact-finding process. 117 To be
sure, the Fifth Amendment’s right not to self-incriminate
enjoys comparable constitutional stature to the right to
confront one’s accusers; however, the former aims to preserve
the individual suspect’s dignity, while the latter aims to insure
109

508 U.S. 333 (1993).
905 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1990).
111
Gilmore, 508 U.S. at 345 (holding that the Falconer rule does not “fall[]
into that small core of rules requiring observance of those procedures that . . . are
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
112
United States v. Mandanici, 205 F.3d 519, 529 (2d Cir. 2000) (summarizing
the Falconer rule).
113
494 U.S. 407 (1990).
114
486 U.S. 675 (1988).
115
Butler, 494 U.S. at 411 (citing Roberson, 486 U.S. at 682).
116
Id. at 416.
117
Id.
110
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the accuracy of the trial. Accordingly, since Teague insists that
a retroactive rule impact the determination of innocence or
guilt, 118 Crawford is a better candidate for retroactivity than
Roberson.
The Supreme Court has invoked Gideon v. Wainwright,
which conferred the right to counsel upon indigent
defendants, 119 to exemplify the type of case capable of satisfying
Teague’s second exception. 120 Crawford is of Gideon’s ilk.
Gideon declared that a fair trial “cannot be realized if the poor
man charged with a crime has to face his accusers without a
lawyer to assist him.” 121 One might naturally doubt the utility
of a lawyer, however, without the right to face one’s accusers.
Skilled lawyers and pro se litigants alike would be unable to
mount a defense without the ability to confront adverse
witnesses.
For example, Michael Crawford was represented by
counsel, yet his lawyer was not allowed to cross-examine
Sylvia. Had he been extended this “privilege,” he may have
inquired as to her vantage point during the incident. In turn
she may have replied, truthfully in fact, that her eyes were
closed. 122 Indeed, a lawyer is often essential to the fairness of a
proceeding, but before a lawyer can be effective the proceeding
must comport with Crawford, allowing the defendant to
confront testimonial statements. In other words, the right of
confrontation preserves and gives content to the right to
counsel. Accordingly, since the Court uses Gideon as its
retroactivity benchmark, and since Crawford is just as, if not
more, important to fairness and trial accuracy, Crawford must
be made retroactive. 123
118

See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
120
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (“Although the precise contours of
[the second Teague] exception may be difficult to discern, [the Court] ha[s] usually cited
Gideon v. Wainwright, holding that a defendant has the right to be represented by
counsel . . . to illustrate the type of rule coming within the exception.” (citation
omitted)).
121
372 U.S. at 344 (emphasis added).
122
State v. Crawford, No. 25307-1-II, 2001 WL 850119, at *5 (Wash. App. Div.
2, July 30, 2001), rev’d, 54 P.3d 656 (Wash. 2002), rev’d sub nom., Crawford, 541 U.S.
36 (“Sylvia stated that she shut her eyes during the stabbing. Cross-examination could
show that she did not see Lee attack Michael because of this. We conclude that crossexamination could reveal that she lacked knowledge of what happened.”).
123
See Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1019 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Recognizing
that bedrock procedural rules are very few in number, it is no leap to conclude that the
right of cross-examination as an adjunct to the constitutional right of confrontation
joins the very limited company of Gideon.”).
119
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To be sure, Teague and its progeny make it quite
difficult for a “new” rule to achieve retroactive effect. The
twelve “new” rules that the Supreme Court has declined to
make retroactive exemplify the narrowness of the Teague
standard. Nevertheless, no rule as significant as Crawford has
yet endured Teague’s scrutiny. The second Teague exception
exists so that rules of the magnitude of Gideon and Crawford
can achieve retroactive effect, while rules like the ones which
hitherto have failed will not upset society’s countervailing
interests. The second Teague exception is narrow, but not
closed, and Crawford satisfies its requirements. 124
B.

The Supreme Court’s Language in Crawford Indicates
That the Confrontation Clause is a Bedrock
Constitutional Guarantee Essential to a Fair Trial

The Supreme Court’s language in the Crawford opinion
suggests that its rule is important enough to prevail under a
Teague retroactivity analysis. 125 In Crawford, the Supreme
Court expressly stated its view that the right of confrontation
is a “bedrock procedural guarantee,” 126 and that Roberts
constituted an egregious constitutional flaw. Although none of
the Court’s language speaks specifically to the retroactivity
issue, one can reasonably infer from the Court’s language that
Crawford warrants retroactivity.
Justice Scalia consulted history, and determined that
“the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was
directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and
particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence
against the accused.” 127 Moreover, the Court declared that the
124
See, e.g., Valladares, supra note 7, at 12, 16 (“There is a strong argument
that Crawford is one of those very rare new rules that is essential to our concepts of
fundamental fairness.”).
125
See Bockting, 399 F.3d at 1016 (“That the Crawford requirement is
fundamental to our legal regime is beyond dispute. Justice Scalia’s eloquent recitation
of the history, purpose, and place of the Confrontation Clause and cross-examination
answers this question.”); People v. Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2133,
at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004) (“The language used in the Crawford decision itself
also lends support to the view that its declaration of the rule prohibiting the admission
of testimonial statements at trial unless they have been subject to cross-examination is
watershed.”).
126
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004).
127
Id. at 50 (emphasis added). In particular, Justice Scalia recounted the
1603 treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh. Raleigh’s alleged accomplice, Lord Cobham,
implicated Raleigh in letters. Cobham did not testify, but his letters were read at
Raleigh’s trial. According to Justice Scalia,

2006]

RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF CRAWFORD

1651

right of confrontation is the Sixth Amendment’s “primary
object,” 128 and deemed the right a “categorical constitutional
guarantee[].” 129
Additionally, the Roberts framework, according to
Crawford, was “fundamentally at odds” with the Confrontation
Clause 130 and hence, “[did] violence to [its] design.” 131 While
Roberts admitted hearsay based on notions of reliability, 132
Crawford declared that the only constitutionally permissible
method by which to determine reliability is “testing in the
crucible of cross-examination.” 133 Indeed, the Court notes that
Michael Crawford’s conviction under Roberts “reveal[ed] a
fundamental failure on [the Court’s] part to interpret the
Constitution in a way that secures its intended constraint on
judicial discretion.” 134
Although Crawford did not contemplate retroactivity, it
couched its holding in strong, unequivocal language, intimating
that its rule should satisfy Teague. Indeed, to hold otherwise
would render Crawford’s language meaningless rhetoric.
C.

Two Supreme Court Cases, Though Predating Teague,
Dictate That Crawford Should Be Retroactive

In two cases, Roberts v. Russell 135 and Berger v.
California, 136 the Court deemed rules implicating the
Confrontation Clause retroactive. Although both cases predate

Raleigh argued that Cobham had lied to save himself: “Cobham is absolutely
in the King’s mercy; to excuse me cannot avail him; by accusing me he may
hope for favor.” Suspecting that Cobham would recant, Raleigh demanded
that the judges call him to appear, arguing that “[t]he Proof of the Common
Law is by witness and jury: let Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call my
accuser before my face . . . .” The Judges refused, and, despite Raleigh’s
protestations that he was being tried “by the Spanish Inquisition,” the jury
convicted, and Raleigh was sentenced to death.
Id. at 44 (internal citations omitted). Justice Scalia then noted, “[O]ne of Raleigh’s
trial judges later lamented that ‘the justice of England has never been so degraded
and injured as by the condemnation of Sir Walter Raleigh.’” Id.
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

Id. at 53.
Id. at 67-68.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 68.
See supra Part II (discussing the Roberts framework).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
Id. at 67.
392 U.S. 293 (1968).
393 U.S. 314 (1969).
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Teague, they are persuasive evidence of the high regard in
which the Court holds the Confrontation Clause.
1.

Bruton v. United States

Bruton v. United States 137 concerned Bruton, who had
been convicted of robbery. 138 He was tried jointly with his
alleged accomplice, Evans. 139 Evans did not testify at the trial,
but the prosecution introduced his oral confession, which
incriminated Bruton. 140 Bruton challenged his conviction,
claiming that the trial judge erred by admitting Evans’s
confession in violation of his, Bruton’s, confrontation right. 141
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, applying Delli
Paoli v. United States, 142 upheld Bruton’s conviction because
the trial judge instructed the jury not to consider Evans’s
confession when determining Bruton’s guilt. 143 On appeal, the
Supreme Court overruled Delli Paoli, and reversed the Eighth
Circuit, holding that “despite instructions to the jury to
disregard the implicating statements in determining the
codefendant’s guilt or innocence, admission at a joint trial of a

137

391 U.S. 123 (1968).
Id. at 124.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. Evans also challenged his conviction and prevailed after the Circuit
Court held that Evans’s confession was obtained in violation of the recently decided
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124, n.1.
142
352 U.S. 232 (1957). Delli Paoli allowed a codefendant’s confession to be
admitted at a joint trial if the judge gave limiting instructions. Id. at 239.
143
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124-25. The trial judge instructed the jury as follows:
138

A confession made outside of court by one defendant may not be considered
as evidence against the other defendant, who was not present and in no way
a party to the confession. Therefore, if you find that a confession was in fact
voluntarily and intentionally made by the defendant Evans, you should
consider it as evidence in the case against Evans, but you must not consider
it, and should disregard it, in considering the evidence in the case against the
defendant Bruton.
....
It is your duty to give separate, personal consideration to the cause of each
individual defendant. When you do so, you should analyze what the evidence
shows with respect to that individual, leaving out of consideration entirely
any evidence admitted solely against some other defendant. Each defendant
is entitled to have his case determined from his own acts and statements and
the other evidence in the case which may be applicable to him.” Id. at 125 n.2
(quoting Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355, 362 n.6 (1967), rev’d sub nom.,
Bruton, 391 U.S. 123) (alteration in original).
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defendant’s extra-judicial confession implicating a codefendant
violated the codefendant’s right of cross-examination.” 144
In Roberts v. Russell 145 the Supreme Court applied the
Bruton rule retroactively. The Russell Court held that “the
error” from Delli Paoli in admitting such statements “‘went to
the basis of fair hearing and trial because the procedural
apparatus never assured the [petitioner] a fair determination’
With “[d]ue regard for
of his guilt or innocence.” 146
countervailing considerations,” the Russell Court concluded
that “even if the impact of retroactivity may be significant, the
constitutional error presents a serious risk that the issue of
guilt or innocence may not have been reliably determined.” 147
Accordingly, the Court determined that the Bruton rule must
apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. 148
Although Russell was decided in 1968, twenty-one years
before Teague narrowed the scope of habeas review, its holding
remains significant even after Teague. Teague relied heavily
on the importance of finality and the administration of
The Russell Court clearly considered these
justice. 149
“countervailing” 150 interests yet concluded that “the impact of
retroactivity upon the administration of justice [did] not
counsel against retroactivity of Bruton.
The element of
reliance [was] not persuasive . . . .” 151
Moreover, Teague’s primary departure from existing
retroactivity doctrine was the second prong of its second
144

Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 294 (1969).
392 U.S. 293.
146
Id. at 294 (alteration in original) (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618, 639 n.20 (1965)). The Bruton Court elaborated:
145

[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot,
follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the
defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system
cannot be ignored. Such a context is presented here, where the powerfully
incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant . . . are deliberately
spread before the jury in a joint trial.
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-36 (citations omitted).
147
Russell, 392 U.S. at 295 (emphasis added).
148
Id.
149
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (“Application of constitutional
rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the
principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.”).
150
Russell, 392 U.S. at 295.
151
Id. (citation omitted) (“Due regard for countervailing considerations—
reliance on the old standard of Delli Paoli and the impact of retroactivity upon the
administration of justice—does not counsel against retroactivity of Bruton. The
element of reliance is not persuasive . . . .” (citation omitted)).
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exception, 152 which requires a new rule to be “watershed” and to
“implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial.” 153 Indeed,
Russell, though not constitutionally required to do so (as
Teague had not yet imposed the obligation), contemplated this
aspect of the Bruton rule, and predicated its holding of
retroactivity on the belief that to deny the benefit of the rule
would “present[] a serious risk that the issue of guilt or
innocence may not have been reliably determined.” 154
Additionally, the Russell Court likened the Bruton rule
of Confrontation Clause interpretation to the rule of Gideon v.
Wainwright. 155 Courts have often refused to hold “new” rules
retroactive because the Supreme Court instructs that a new
rule must be comparable to the Gideon rule to warrant
retroactivity. 156 Russell cited Gideon to support its proposition
that the Supreme Court has “retroactively applied rules of
criminal procedure fashioned to correct flaws in the fact-finding
process at trial.” 157 Relying on Gideon as authority indicates
that the Court believed the right of confrontation to be
tantamount to the right to counsel.
It thus seems very reasonable to conclude that the
Russell analysis, though not controlled by Teague, was just as
demanding, and that even under the Teague standard the
Russell Court would have applied Bruton retroactively. Since
Crawford’s rule is similar to Bruton’s, Crawford deserves equal
consideration when subjected to retroactivity analysis.
2.

Barber v. Page

Likewise, the Supreme Court applied Barber v. Page 158
retroactively in Berger v. California. 159 Barber v. Page declared
152

See supra note 74.
Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 312.
154
Russell, 392 U.S. at 295.
155
Russell, 392 U.S. at 294 (comparing Bruton to Gideon).
156
See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 417 (2004); Saffle v. Parks, 494
U.S. 484, 495 (1990). Gideon v. Wainwright conferred on indigent defendants the right
to counsel. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
157
Russell, 392 U.S. at 294 (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298
(1967)).
158
390 U.S. 719 (1968).
159
393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969) (“[W]e can see no reason why Barber v. Page
should not be given fully retroactive application.”). See generally People v. Watson, No.
7715/90, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2133, at *8 n.5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004) (“[A]t the
time that Berger v. California and Roberts v. Russell were decided, the retroactivity of
any new rule was determined under the [Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965)]
standard, regardless of when the defendant’s conviction became final.”).
153
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that the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness currently
outside of the jurisdiction is inadmissible absent a good faith
effort by the state to secure the witness’s presence. 160 In
deeming the rule retroactive, the Berger Court determined that
notwithstanding the state’s “countervailing interests,” 161 the
opportunity to cross-examine a witness has a “significant effect
on the ‘integrity of the fact-finding process.’” 162 Barber and
Crawford alike make it more difficult for the prosecution to use
evidence absent confrontation, and both cases stand on the
proposition that the Confrontation Clause is essential to
fairness.
Since Barber was made retroactive, so should
Crawford be.
In summary, Crawford’s rule is of comparable
importance to the rules of Bruton and Barber. All three rules
seek to give content to the same “bedrock procedural
guarantee,” 163 the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment. Bruton held that a codefendant’s confession may
not be admitted as evidence at a joint trial, regardless of
cautionary jury instructions, 164 and Barber made inadmissible
statements of non-testifying, out-of-jurisdiction witnesses. 165
Similarly, Crawford held that “testimonial” statements were
inadmissible absent the opportunity for cross-examination. 166
Each rule corrected a similar constitutional vice. 167 Since
Teague, the Supreme Court has not considered the retroactivity
of a “new” rule concerning the Confrontation Clause.
Nevertheless, since Berger and Russell imply that
Confrontation Clause violations affect the fairness and
accuracy of the trial, even under Teague, both rules would

160

Barber, 390 U.S. at 724-25 (“In short, a witness is not ‘unavailable’ for
purposes of the foregoing exception to the confrontation requirement unless the
prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at
trial. . . . The right of confrontation may not be dispensed with so lightly.”).
161
Berger, 393 U.S. at 315 (“California’s claim of . . . countervailing
interest[s] . . . is most unpersuasive.”).
162
Id. (quoting Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 639).
163
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004).
164
Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 293 (1968) (summarizing Bruton).
165
Barber, 390 U.S. at 724-25.
166
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69 (“Where testimonial statements are at issue,
the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one
the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”).
167
See Russell, 392 U.S. at 294; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63 (“The unpardonable
vice of the Roberts test, however, is not its unpredictability, but its demonstrated
capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly
meant to exclude.”).
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deserve retroactivity. 168 Crawford, like Bruton and Barber
before it, corrected an error in Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence. Accordingly, Crawford, when subjected to
Teague’s scrutiny, should be given full retroactive effect.
D.

The Retroactivity of Cruz v. New York Dictates that
Crawford Qualifies for the Second Teague Exception

Both the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 169 and the New
York Court of Appeals 170 retroactively applied the Supreme
Court’s holding in Cruz v. New York. 171 Both courts analyzed
retroactivity under Teague, and both concluded that the Cruz
rule was sufficiently “watershed” to fit within Teague’s second
exception.
Since both Cruz and Crawford implicate the
Confrontation Clause, and since Crawford is at least as, if not
more, necessary to the fundamental fairness and accuracy of
the trial, Crawford also deserves retroactive application.
Cruz v. New York concerned Eulogio and Benjamin
Cruz, who were tried jointly for the felony murder of a gas
station attendant. 172 At trial, prosecutors played a taped
statement made by Benjamin, which incriminated Eulogio. 173
Benjamin did not testify at trial, and hence was unavailable to
Eulogio for cross-examination. 174 The judge, recognizing that
Benjamin’s statement was inadmissible against Eulogio,
instructed the jury not to consider Benjamin’s statement when
determining Eulogio’s guilt. 175 Eulogio had also confessed, but
his confession was found inadmissible. The jury returned a
guilty verdict against Eulogio despite the lack of admissible

168

One court recently noted that

[N]otwithstanding the fact that Roberts v. Russell and Berger v. California
were not decided according to the Teague standard, they support the view
that the constitutional right to confront witnesses is a watershed rule,
because they indicate that a violation of this right implicates the fairness of
the trial and the accuracy of the fact-finding process.
People v. Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2133, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov.
8, 2004).
169
Graham v. Hoke, 946 F.2d 982, 983 (2d Cir. 1991).
170
People v. Eastman, 85 N.Y.2d 265, 268 (1995).
171
481 U.S. 186 (1987).
172
Id. at 189.
173
Id. at 188-89.
174
Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 188-89 (1987).
175
Id. at 189.
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evidence linking him to the murder. 176 Eulogio’s conviction was
upheld on appeal because Eulogio’s own confession, not
admitted at trial, “interlocked” with Benjamin’s. 177 In other
words, Benjamin’s statement was inadmissible against Eulogio,
and Eulogio’s own confession was also inadmissible against
Eulogio, but since both statements were similar, or
“interlocking,” Eulogio’s conviction was upheld despite the lack
of admissible evidence. 178
The Supreme Court, in Cruz v. New York, reversed
Eulogio’s conviction because it violated the Confrontation
Clause. 179 Specifically, Cruz contemplated “interlocking
confessions,” and held that “where a nontestifying
codefendant’s confession incriminating the defendant is not
directly admissible against the defendant, the Confrontation
Clause bars its admission at their joint trial, even if the jury is
instructed not to consider it against the defendant.” 180
Before Cruz, statements of this sort were frequently
admitted if they were “factually consistent” with or
176
Id. (“At the trial’s end, however, Norberto’s testimony stood as the only
evidence admissible against Eulogio that directly linked him to the crime.” But
nevertheless, “the jury convicted both defendants.”).
177
The New York Court of Appeals explained “interlocking confessions” as
follows,

Confessions are “interlocking” if their content is substantially similar. The
statements need not be identical, it is sufficient that both cover all major
elements of the crime involved and are “essentially the same” as to motive,
plot and execution of the crimes. Statements are substantially similar when
defendant’s confession is close enough to the codefendant’s with respect to the
material facts of the crime charged to make the probability of prejudice so
negligible that the end result would be the same without the codefendant’s
statement. Confessions do not “interlock,” however, if a codefendant’s
confession may be used to fill material gaps in the necessary proof against
defendant.
People v. Cruz, 66 N.Y.2d 61, 70 (citations omitted). The court concluded that the Cruz
brothers’ statements did, in fact, “interlock”:
[T]he Cruz brothers agreed, in their separate statements, on the date and
target of the crime, the participants in it, the motive of robbery, and the
essential facts of how defendant was injured and the station attendant killed.
Although Benjamin’s statement was substantially longer, the details included
did not contradict or modify the essential elements of defendant’s statement.
Id. at 71.
178

Id. at 65.
Cruz, 481 U.S. 186, 189 (1987).
180
Id. at 193. “Cruz . . . repudiated the interlocking confession exception to
the Bruton rule that the Parker plurality and several Courts of Appeals . . . previously
had recognized. . . . Parker commonly was perceived as having endorsed an
interlocking confession exception to the Bruton rule.” Graham v. Hoke, 946 F.2d 982,
993 (2d Cir. 1991).
179
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“substantially similar” to the defendant’s own statement. 181
The Cruz Court, however, declared the use of such statements
constitutionally unsound, and in direct conflict with the
precedent established in Bruton. 182 Cruz’s author, Justice
Scalia, concluded that “[t]he law cannot command respect if
such an inexplicable exception to a supposed constitutional
imperative is adopted.” 183
Both the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the New
York Court of Appeals applied the Cruz holding retroactively
under the second Teague exception. In their analyses, both
courts determined that the Cruz rule involved a “bedrock
procedural element.” 184 New York’s highest court, in People v.
Eastman, proclaimed that “Cruz unquestionably . . . implicates
a bedrock procedural element,” 185 while the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, in Graham, announced that “there [could] be
little doubt that the decision altered our understanding of a
bedrock procedural principle.” 186 Graham continued that “[t]he
‘bedrock procedural element’ implicated in Cruz was the right
of confrontation; a right which the Supreme Court long ago
referred to as being ‘one of the fundamental guarantees of life
and liberty,’” 187 and cited with approval the notion that “[t]he
right of cross-examination is more than a desirable rule of trial
procedure.
It is implicit in the constitutional right of
confrontation.”
Eastman and Graham then determined that, in addition
to implicating a “fundamental procedural guarantee,”
application of the Cruz rule is essential to a fair trial. 188
According to the Eastman court, the Cruz rule is necessary in
order for “the procedural apparatus of trial . . . [to] assure[] the
181

People v. Eastman, 85 N.Y.2d 265, 273-74, 274 n.4 (1995).
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (holding that a defendant is
deprived of his Confrontation Clause rights when a codefendant’s incriminating
confession is introduced at their joint trial, even if cautionary instructions were given
to the jury to disregard the statement).
183
481 U.S. at 193.
184
Graham, 946 F.2d at 993; Eastman, 85 N.Y.2d at 276. Graham did not
actually make the determination of whether Cruz announced a “new” or an “old” rule.
However, the court reasoned that the rule is retroactive either way. Graham, 946 F.2d
at 992 (“[W]e find it unnecessary to categorize the Cruz rule as either a ‘new’ or ‘old’
rule of constitutional criminal procedure. Rather, we . . . believe that regardless of
whether the Cruz rule is characterized as a ‘new’ or ‘old’ rule it should be applied
retroactively.”).
185
Eastman, 85 N.Y.2d at 276.
186
Graham, 946 F.2d at 993.
187
Id. at 994 (quoting Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899)).
188
Id. at 993-94; Eastman, 85 N.Y.2d at 276.
182
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defendant a fair determination of guilt or innocence,” 189 and the
admission of the types of statements proscribed by Cruz
“undermine[s] . . . fundamental fairness.” 190 Similarly, Graham
held that the Cruz rule is necessary to “ensure[] a fair
proceeding.” 191 Graham concluded that “[t]he Cruz rule . . .
satisfies [Teague’s] second exception to the general rule against
retroactive application of ‘new’ constitutional rules of criminal
procedure,” 192 and that “[e]ven if the impact of retroactivity may
be significant, the constitutional error presents a serious risk
that the issue of guilt or innocence may not have been reliably
determined.” 193
The Crawford rule is analogous to the Cruz rule, and
hence, deserves equal treatment for retroactivity purposes.
Both rules severely limited the kind of evidence which may be
admitted
without
cross-examination;
Cruz
rejected
“interlocking” confessions, 194 while Crawford rejected all
“testimonial” statements. 195 Both corrected flaws in the Court’s
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 196
In fact, Crawford corrected an even greater affront to
the Confrontation Clause than did Cruz.
In Cruz, the
defendant and codefendant were tried jointly, but the
codefendant’s statement was introduced only against the
codefendant; the court explicitly directed jurors not to consider
the statement in evaluating Cruz’s guilt. 197 Even though the
Cruz Court concluded that jurors could not reasonably be
expected to obey such an instruction, 198 the resulting
Confrontation Clause violation was still indirect. The Cruz
trial court recognized that jurors should not consider the
testimony at issue, and instructed the jury accordingly.
On the other hand, in Crawford, the trial court admitted
testimonial hearsay directly against the defendant. Limiting
instructions were never given, not even difficult or impossible189

Eastman, 85 N.Y.2d at 276.
Id.
191
Graham, 946 F.2d at 993-94.
192
Id.
193
Id. at 994 (quoting Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 295 (1968)).
194
Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987).
195
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2005).
196
Id. at 61 (“Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is
fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation.”); Cruz, 481 U.S. at 193 (“The
law cannot command respect if such an inexplicable exception to a supposed
constitutional imperative is adopted.”).
197
Cruz, 481 U.S. at 189.
198
Id. at 193.
190
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to-obey ones. 199 The court invited the Crawford jury to consider
the ex parte accusatory statement for its truth in deciding
whether or not to convict. 200 Therefore, reason dictates that if
Cruz twice achieved retroactive effect under Teague, then
surely Crawford, correcting an even more egregious
constitutional malady, should receive equal consideration.
E.

Litigation Concerning Crawford’s Retroactivity has
Begun, and Lower State and Federal Courts Are in
Disagreement

Of the five federal circuits that have ruled on
Crawford’s retroactivity, only one concluded that Crawford’s
rule qualified under Teague’s second exception. 201 Those failing
to find Crawford retroactive, however, have done so after only a
cursory analysis. 202 Some have flatly stated that Crawford is
not “watershed,” effectively assuming that which they should
be attempting to prove. 203 Others have chosen to make the fact
that Confrontation Clause violations are subject to harmless

199

See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40-41.
Id. at 40.
201
The Ninth Circuit has held Crawford retroactive under the second Teague
exception. Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1019-21 (9th Cir. 2005). The Second,
Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have decided not to make Crawford retroactive.
Bintz v. Bertrand, 403 F.3d 859, 867 (7th Cir. 2005); Murillo v. Frank, 402 F.3d 786,
790 (7th Cir. 2005); Dorchy v. Jones, 398 F.3d 783, 788 (6th Cir. 2005); Mungo v.
Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 336 (2d Cir. 2004); Brown v. Uphoff, 381 F.3d 1219, 1227 (10th
Cir. 2004). The Eighth Circuit has indicated that Crawford is not retroactive. Evans
v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438, 444-45 (8th Cir. 2004) (suggesting in dicta that Crawford
does not apply retroactively).
202
See, e.g., Bockting, 399 F.3d at 1020 (“The flaw in this analysis [declining
to make Crawford retroactive] is that the Second Circuit has substituted its judgment
of whether the Crawford rule is one without which the accuracy of conviction is
seriously diminished, for the Supreme Court’s considered judgment.”); People v.
Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2133, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004)
(“For the most part, however, with little analysis, these courts have generally held that
Crawford . . . did not announce a watershed rule of criminal procedure.” The court
continued that, “[w]here explanations have been proffered for this conclusion, these
courts have generally pointed to the fact that a Confrontation Clause violation is
subject to harmless error analysis.”).
203
See, e.g., Brown, 381 F.3d at 1226; Evans, 371 F.3d at 444-45; Garcia v.
United States, No. 04-CV-0465, 2004 WL 1752588, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2004);
Hutzenlaub v. Portuondo, 325 F. Supp. 2d 236, 237-38 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Wheeler v.
Dretke, No. Civ.A. 404CV026Y, 2004 WL 1532178, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 6, 2004);
Murillo v. Frank, 316 F. Supp.2d 744, 749 (E.D. Wis. 2004), aff’d, 402 F.3d 786. Some
state courts have held similarly. See, e.g., People v. Edwards, 101 P.3d 1118, 1122 (Ct.
App. Colo. 2004), aff’d, 129 P.3d 977, No. 04SC565, 2006 WL 320992 (Colo. Feb. 13,
2006); People v. Khan, No. 499-90, 2004 WL 1463027, at *4-5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 23,
2004).
200
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error 204 analysis fatal to Crawford’s retroactivity. 205
The
Supreme Court, however, has never indicated that a rule
subject to harmless error analysis may not be deemed
“watershed” under Teague. 206 In fact, the constitutional error
corrected by Cruz was also subject to harmless error analysis,
yet it was made retroactive by the New York Court of Appeals
and the Second Circuit. 207 Therefore, that a Confrontation
Clause violation may not require automatic reversal does not
preclude the rule from fitting within the second Teague
exception.
Two New York Appellate Division cases, citing
Eastman, recently found Crawford retroactive under the
second Teague exception. People v. Watson 208 and People v.
Dobbin 209 both held that since Eastman declared that Cruz
satisfied Teague, then so does Crawford. 210 The implicit logic in
Watson and Dobbin is clear. Both courts analogized Cruz to
Crawford, and concluded that the Crawford rule is at least as,
if not more, constitutionally imperative than the Cruz rule.
Thus, because Cruz satisfied Teague, Crawford does as well.
Since the New York Court of Appeals and the Second Circuit
applied Cruz retroactively on collateral review, 211 making
Crawford retroactive was the only sensible conclusion. 212

204
Harmless error review means that even if there was a mistake at trial the
verdict will stand unless the mistake affected the substantial rights of the parties. See
LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 1298.
205
See, e.g., Brown, 381 F.3d at 1226-27; Garcia, 2004 WL 1752588, at *4
(N.D.N.Y. 2004). “These courts have reasoned that because Confrontation Clause
errors are subject to harmless error review, new rules altering the clause’s application
do not deprive a defendant of his or her fundamental right to due process and,
therefore, [Crawford] cannot be considered a watershed rule.” People v. Watson, No.
7715/90, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2133, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004) (citation
omitted).
206
Watson, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2133, at *10 n.7 (“The Supreme Court has
never issued any decision . . . indicating that a rule which is subject to harmless error
analysis cannot be considered a watershed rule.”); see also Bockting, 399 F.3d at 1020
(“[W]hether a rule of constitutional law is subject to harmless error review does not
answer the question whether it is a bedrock rule of procedure.”).
207
See discussion supra notes 167-91 and accompanying text.
208
2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2133.
209
791 N.Y.S.2d 897 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
210
Watson, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2133, at *9 (“[A]pplying Teague’s
teachings, this court finds that the rule announced in Crawford is a ‘watershed’ rule of
Criminal Procedure, and thus applies to cases on collateral review.”); Dobbin, 791
N.Y.S.2d at 905 (“[T]he Crawford rule must be applied retroactively on collateral
review.”) (italics added).
211
Watson and Dobbin were New York Appellate Division cases. Thus, People
v. Eastman, 85 N.Y.2d 265 (1995), decided by the New York Court of Appeals, was
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CONCLUSION

With Crawford the Supreme Court corrected an
“unpardonable” 213 flaw in its jurisprudence, and restored the
Confrontation Clause to its rightful status as a bedrock
constitutional guarantee essential to a fair trial.
Notwithstanding the high bar set by Teague and its progeny,
Crawford deserves to be applied retroactively.
As a “new” rule, Crawford’s retroactivity turns on
whether it fits within the contours of the second Teague
exception. Teague adopted a strict standard for the retroactive
application of “new” rules, so strict in fact that the Supreme
Court has yet to find a rule capable of satisfying it. The Court,
however, has never applied the Teague framework to a rule as
significant as Crawford’s. Crawford is more important than,
and thus distinguishable from, its “new” rule predecessors, all
of which failed under Teague.
What separates Crawford from other “new” rules not
worthy of retroactivity is its subject, the Confrontation Clause.
Prior to Teague, the Supreme Court twice gave retroactive
effect to “new” rules concerning the Confrontation Clause, both
times concluding that to deprive a defendant of the right of
confrontation was to withhold a fundamental constitutional
guarantee essential to a fair trial. Furthermore, the New York
Court of Appeals and the Second Circuit both applied the
Supreme Court’s holding in Cruz v. New York retroactively,
demonstrating that even under the strict Teague framework,
the importance of the Confrontation Clause outweighs the
negative implications of retroactivity.
Roberts’s malleable test rendered the Confrontation
Clause constitutionally infirm. With Crawford, the Supreme
Court resuscitated the right of confrontation, and with it, the
legitimacy of criminal trials. The Supreme Court admittedly
“[did] violence to [the] design” of the Confrontation Clause

binding precedent; Graham v. Hoke, 946 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1991), decided by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, was merely persuasive.
212
Recently the Second Circuit held that Crawford is not retroactive under
Teague, yet failed to cite Graham in its analysis. Mungo v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 336
(2d Cir. 2004). Nor did the court make any attempt to distinguish the Cruz rule, made
retroactive in Graham, with the Crawford rule. Id. See Part IV.D, supra, for a
comparison of Crawford to Cruz, and for an argument that Crawford, in fact, corrected
an even more serious constitutional flaw.
213
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004).
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when it endorsed the Roberts test, 214 and limiting Crawford to
prospective application would exacerbate Roberts’s damage.
In summary, neither history nor precedent leaves any
doubt that the right of confrontation is crucial to a fair trial,
Roberts denied criminal defendants the enjoyment of that
right, and Crawford corrected Roberts’s mistake. Only one
conclusion follows: Crawford v. Washington must be applied
retroactively.
Brian Spitser †

214
Id. at 67-68 (“By replacing categorical constitutional guarantees with openended balancing tests, we do violence to their design.”).
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